Our hardware-obsessed military and its fanboys see only tools while the nature of war itself evolves. Overall, Fighting Power presents a provocative thesis in arguing for German martial superiority.Summary: The revolution in military affairs continues, silently and invisibly. One can also view Fighting Power as demonstrating the inherent weaknesses in the American military that numerically superior material resources masked the Vietnam War exposed these flaws. In one respect, van Creveld argues that even a tactically superior military can lose a war despite possessing superior leadership, structure, and organization much like the U.S military in Vietnam. army overcame its structural flaws with overwhelming resources.

Written after the Vietnam War, Fighting Power attempts to argue that the Germans possessed a superior military institution during World War II and that the U.S. Interestingly, van Creveld mentions that the ideas behind Auftragstaktik came from Hessian soldiers that served in the American War for Independence, but he does not bother to go into detail as to where or how Hessian soldiers acquired this command doctrine. In contrast, van Creveld argues that the Americans used a rigid and inflexible command style that limited their combat effectiveness.

The author cites Auftragstaktik (mission-oriented command system) as the reason for German command flexibility. Van Creveld compares the command principles of the German and American armies and concludes that latitude given to German commanders allowed them to fight more effectively than their American counterparts. The author argues that the American army possessed a managerial approach to war that did not allow for flexibility in doctrine. In contrast, American military doctrine, van Creveld argues, relied on its material dominance and application of doctrine to win wars. Van Creveld points out that the Germans, geographically located in the middle of Europe and historically at odds with factions on both sides, devised a strategy that called for quick, decisive action to win wars. The author cites the differences between German and American military doctrine as a key factor that determined their effectiveness. army developed a completely different fighting style than the Germans. army made the comparison possible and that the U.S. army because, as he says, the availability of data for the U.S. Van Creveld compares the performance of the German army to the U.S. Van Creveld bases his argument on the statistical analysis of Trevor N. Army Performance, 1939–1945 that Germany developed a fighting force that excelled in combat and sustained its fighting power through six years of war. Martin van Creveld argues in Fighting Power: German and U.S.

Martin van creveld fighting power